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THE SIREN SONG OF INTERROGATIONAL
TORTURE: EVALUATING THE U.S.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U.N.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
ISAAC A. LINNARTZ†
ABSTRACT
Though the United States officially condemns all forms of torture,
it has not adequately implemented the United Nations Convention
Against Torture. This Note focuses on instances in which the United
States has transferred suspected terrorists to countries that practice
interrogational torture. It contends that these renditions demonstrate a
lingering belief that interrogational torture is sometimes necessary to
obtain vital intelligence information. Unfortunately, this belief has
developed in a secretive manner that is antithetical to democratic
principles of transparency and accountability. This Note argues that
the United States should reject all forms of interrogational torture by
fully implementing international norms that forbid engaging in or
facilitating state-sponsored torture.

INTRODUCTION
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States embarked on an aggressive global antiterrorism campaign
often described as the “War on Terror.”1 This “War on Terror” has
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1. George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (“Our war on
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raised questions about the United States’ commitment to
international norms that prohibit engaging in or facilitating state2
sponsored torture. In particular, there have been persistent
allegations that the United States has “outsourced” torture by
rendering suspected terrorists to countries that practice statesponsored torture.3 Such renditions are often described as
“extraordinary renditions” to differentiate them from renditions
carried out according to the regular processes that govern extradition
and immigration matters.4 Prior to the “War on Terror,”
extraordinary renditions often involved returning criminals to face
trial, but the practice has expanded to serve other ends in the struggle
against terrorism.5

terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group
of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” (emphasis added)).
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See, e.g., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS &
GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS” 28–35 (2004) (collecting
reports of renditions to torture carried out by the United States); David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123,
123–24 (2006) (describing several reports of renditions to torture); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing
Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106–07, available at http://www.newyorker.
com/printables/fact/050214fa_fact6 (describing instances in which suspects were rendered to
other countries and stating that “[t]he most common destinations for rendered suspects are
Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Jordan, all of which . . . are known to torture suspects”).
4. Even renditions carried out according to these regular processes can raise the same
normative issues that extraordinary rendition does, as is apparent from examining Maher Arar’s
removal to Syria. See infra notes 18–39 and accompanying text. This Note defines extraordinary
rendition as the transfer of an individual from the control of the United States to the control of
a foreign state outside the normal extradition and immigration processes. Furthermore, it uses
the term “extraordinary rendition” instead of “snatch,” “rendition,” “irregular rendition,” or
other possible terms. The practice is unquestionably both extraordinary and irregular, but
“extraordinary rendition” seems to be the most common label. See A. John Radsan, A More
Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2006) (comparing the
terms “snatch,” “irregular rendition,” and “extraordinary rendition”).
5. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transatlantic
Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human Rights, and
Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 12
(2007) (statement of Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, Central Intelligence
Agency), available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/34712.pdf (discussing the beginning of
the CIA’s rendition program in 1995 and stating that “interrogation was never a goal under
President Clinton”). Scheuer proceeded to explain that interrogation was not pursued
[b]ecause it would be a foreign intelligence or security service without CIA being
present or in control who would conduct the interrogation, because the take from the
interrogation would be filtered by that service holding the individual and we never
knew if it was complete or distorted, and because torture might be used and the
information might be simply what an individual thought we wanted to hear.
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A number of journalists and organizations have documented
6
extraordinary renditions, but many of these individual accounts are
difficult to verify.7 Despite the disputed validity of these stories, the
potential for extraordinary renditions as part of the “War on Terror”
should prompt an examination of how the United States has
understood and implemented its self-chosen international legal
obligations to prevent torture—specifically, the United Nations
Convention Against Torture8 and the Fourth Geneva Convention.9
Examining these regimes reveals the weakest link in the United
States’ stance against terror—the possibility that it might transfer
detainees to countries that practice interrogational torture and then
partake of the fruits of those interrogations. International law forbids
10
such transfers, but this Note argues that the United States has not
effectively implemented these legal principles.11 Indeed, the struggle
against terrorism has increased the demand for interrogational
torture, thereby revealing the United States’ failure to fully
implement international norms against torture into its domestic law.12
Specifically, this Note contends that the United States has failed
13
to fully implement the Convention Against Torture. This failure is
particularly troubling after September 11, 2001, when a focus on
eliminating terrorism has put a premium on gathering intelligence on
terrorist operations and spawned theories that might justify
Id.; see also Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2007) (“The administration has transformed the practice of extraordinary
rendition from a mechanism used to transfer accused criminals to a country where they would
face trial to a preventive technique whereby suspects are sent to third countries not to try them
for crimes they allegedly committed, but to torture and preventively detain them without charge
in order to obtain information to prevent future crimes.”).
6. For summaries of these accounts, see sources cited supra note 3.
7. These accounts are particularly difficult to verify because the United States generally
does not comment on such intelligence matters, and courts have been hesitant to make findings
of fact in the limited instances in which the legality of these practices has been litigated. See, e.g.,
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing all claims against
government officials arising from a suspected terrorist’s removal to Syria without evaluating the
veracity of the allegations or adjudicating the claims on their merits).
8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter IV Geneva Convention].
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part III.
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14
interrogational torture to avert future terrorist attacks. The United
States’ failure to implement the universal prohibition of torture,
combined with its attempts to finesse similar provisions in the Geneva
Conventions, has undermined international norms that forbid torture
regardless of exigent circumstances.15 At the highest political levels,
torture apparently remains on the table as a legitimate intelligence16
gathering tool. Unfortunately, the secrecy that surrounds these
intelligence matters has shrouded the high-level debate over whether
torture is ever acceptable, effectively precluding robust public
17
discussion over the legitimacy of interrogational torture.
These problems are evident in the story of Maher Arar. On
September 26, 2002, Arar flew into New York’s John F. Kennedy
18
International Airport (JFK). He was returning to Canada from
vacationing with his wife and children in Tunisia.19 Arar held dual
Canadian and Syrian citizenship—he was born in Syria, but had
20
immigrated to Canada with his parents at age seventeen. During a
routine immigration inspection at JFK, Arar was detained, searched,
21
and questioned. FBI agents and immigration officers subsequently
interrogated him for eight hours.22 Unsatisfied with his answers, they
placed Arar in solitary confinement.23 After several days, they
informed him that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 160 (“Countries that have orchestrated
extraordinary renditions have sacrificed the moral authority to be leaders in promoting the rule
of law and respect for human rights. . . . In order to regain international legitimacy, the
architects of extraordinary rendition may need to take dramatic steps to show the world that
they intend to play by the rules. Only then will they have a genuine opportunity to compel other
countries to comply with the important obligations embodied in contemporary human rights
instruments.” (footnotes omitted)).
16. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1460–
61 (2005) (“The only reasonable inference to draw from these recent efforts by the government
to defend its actions is that the torture culture is still firmly in place, notwithstanding official
condemnation of torture.”); see also ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 28–35 (collecting reports of renditions to
torture carried out by the United States).
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. Complaint para. 25, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-04249-DGT-VVP), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Arar%20Complaint_FINAL.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id. para. 11.
21. Id. paras. 26–29.
22. Id. paras. 29, 31.
23. Id. paras. 32–36.
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had found him inadmissible because he belonged to the terrorist
24
organization al Qaeda. When immigration officers asked Arar to
designate a country for removal, he chose Canada.25 Nevertheless,
INS officials informed Arar that they had decided to remove him to
26
Syria. Though Arar expressed fear that he would be tortured in
Syria, immigration officials told him that “[his] removal to Syria
would be consistent with Article 3 of CAT [the Convention Against
Torture].”27
On October 8, Arar was flown in shackles and chains to
28
Washington, D.C., and from there to Amman, Jordan. Jordanian
authorities interrogated and beat him, then turned him over to Syria
29
on October 9. Syrian security officers intensely interrogated Arar for
eighteen hours a day for twelve days.30 These interrogations included
various forms of physical and psychological torture.31 The officers
beat Arar’s palms, hips, and lower back with a thick electrical cable;
32
they also struck his face, stomach, and neck. On occasion they
confined Arar in a “room where he could hear the screams of other
33
detainees being tortured.” They also threatened him with other
forms of torture—a spine-breaking chair, suspension in a tire to
facilitate beating, and electric shocks.34 When he was not facing
interrogation, Arar was confined in a tiny underground cell that was
35
about “six feet long, seven feet high, and three feet wide.” Arar
noted that his interrogators’ questions “bore a striking similarity to
36
those asked . . . by FBI agents at JFK in September, 2002.” To
alleviate his suffering, Arar falsely confessed to having “trained with
terrorists in Afghanistan.”37

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. paras. 37–38.
Id. para. 41.
Id. para. 47.
Id.
Id. para. 49.
Id. para. 50.
Id. para. 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 52.
Id.
Id. para. 58.
Id. para. 54.
Id. para. 53.
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Though Canadian consular officials visited Arar several times,
his captors threatened him with additional torture if he disclosed the
38
torture he had already experienced. Syria eventually released Arar
without filing any criminal charges and “now considers Mr. Arar
39
completely innocent.” After his release, Arar filed several claims in
U.S. district court against the officials who participated in his
40
imprisonment, interrogation, and removal to Syria. The district court
41
dismissed all of his claims. The court did not even reach the
defendants’ assertion of the “state-secrets privilege,” though it
dismissed Arar’s due process claims because of “the national-security
and foreign policy considerations at stake.”42 The Center for
Constitutional Rights, a nonprofit legal advocacy organization acting
on Arar’s behalf, filed an appeal from the district court’s decision in
the Second Circuit on December 12, 2006.43
In Part I, this Note describes the international norm against
engaging in or facilitating state-sponsored torture embodied in the
United Nations Convention Against Torture. Part II explains that the
United States officially condemns all forms of torture and remains
party to the Convention Against Torture. Part III, however,
illustrates several shortcomings in the United States’ domestic legal
implementation of the Convention Against Torture. It also details
how the United States has rationalized circumventing the Fourth
Geneva Convention’s restrictions on detainee transfers. Part IV
examines how increased efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and
eradicate terrorist networks have made interrogational torture a more
expedient option than it used to be. In turn, these preventive efforts
have highlighted the inadequate implementation of international
norms against torture in domestic law. Finally, Part V advocates

38. Id. para. 61.
39. Id. paras. 64–65.
40. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
41. The court dismissed Arar’s various claims on a number of grounds: first, because he
lacked standing to bring a claim for declaratory relief; second, because the Torture Victim
Protection Act does not establish a right of action for noncitizens and only covers acts carried
out under color of foreign law; and third, because his due process claim was foreclosed by an
exception to the Bivens doctrine. Id. at 287–88. The Bivens doctrine recognizes a cause of action
for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights are violated by federal agents. Id. at 267. The court also
dismissed without prejudice the due process claims stemming from Arar’s domestic detention.
Id. at 287.
42. Id. at 287.
43. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 06-4126-cv (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2006),
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Appellant's%20Brief,%2006-4216-cv.pdf.
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comprehensive legislative change to increase the structural and
procedural protections against torture.
I. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
The Convention Against Torture and the Fourth Geneva
Convention codify the international norm prohibiting renditions to
torture. Together, these international agreements provide the
strongest protections against rendition to torture.
A. The United Nations Convention Against Torture
The United Nations Convention Against Torture codifies and
strengthens international norms against torture by prohibiting torture
regardless of what exigent circumstances may arise.44 The Convention
Against Torture was intended to strengthen existing prohibitions on
torture in international law.45 For the purposes of the Convention,
torture is defined as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
46
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

44. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 2 (“No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”).
45. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) (“The principal aim
of the Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition of [torture and other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment] by a number of supportive measures.”). The
Convention’s preamble specifically mentions the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as preexisting international
prohibitions of torture. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, pmbl.
46. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 1, para. 1.
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This language restricts application of the Convention to instances in
47
which torture is politically motivated or sanctioned. Thus, the
Convention Against Torture focuses specifically on state-sponsored
48
torture. This focus is particularly evident in Article 3, which provides
the protection most relevant to the practice of extraordinary
rendition. Article 3 establishes the following requirements:
1. No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
49
violations of human rights.

Article 3 represents an advance over simply prohibiting states from
engaging in torture because it establishes that “a State is not only
responsible for what happens in its own territory, but it must also
refrain from exposing an individual to serious risks outside its
territory by handing him or her over to another State from which
treatment contrary to the Convention might be expected.”50 States
that are party to the Convention are required to implement the terms
51
of the Convention through their own legal systems. Part III.A
discusses how the United States has implemented the Convention.

47. See id. (limiting the definition of torture to instances in which “such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity”).
48. Id.; Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From
Universal Prescription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 103
(2001) (stating that the Convention employs a “more restrictive legal definition which includes
official state sanction and/or participation”).
49. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3.
50. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 45, at 125.
51. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 1 (“Each State Party shall take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction.”); see also Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 98 (stating that
Article 2 “formally established the specific legal obligation of the state to prevent torture”).
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B. The Fourth Geneva Convention
The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the deportation or
52
forcible transfer of “protected persons” out of an occupied territory.
For the purposes of the Convention, “protected persons” are those
who “find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands
of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals.”53 In dealing with “protected persons,” Article 49 states
that “[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are
prohibited, regardless of their motive.”54 According to the leading
commentary on the Geneva Conventions, “The prohibition is
absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in
paragraph 2.”55 These limited exceptions permit transfers or
evacuations only in cases in which the “security of the population” or
56
“imperative military reasons” demand them. Part III.B discusses
how the United States has rationalized circumventing the protections
in the Fourth Geneva Convention.
II. THE OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE
UNITED STATES REGARDING TORTURE
The United States maintains a strong official stance against
torture; indeed, President George W. Bush has said, “I want to be
absolutely clear . . . . The United States does not torture. It’s against
our laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it—and I
will not authorize it.”57 Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice has
echoed this statement, saying that “[t]he United States does not
permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances.”58 This
position was reiterated in the United States’ 2006 presentation to the

52.
53.
54.
55.

IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 49, para. 1.
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 279 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958).
56. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49, para. 2.
57. George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1573
(Sept. 6, 2006).
58. Condoleeza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks Upon Her Departure for Europe (Dec.
5, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/57602.htm.
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Committee Against Torture, which monitors the compliance of
59
countries that are party to the Convention. In that presentation,
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor Barry Lowenkron stated that the United States was
“committed to upholding [its] national and international obligations
to eradicate torture and to prevent cruel, inhuman or degrading
60
treatment or punishment.” In addition, Lowenkron stressed that the
United States was committed to “transparency about our policies and
actions.”61 Like many countries, the United States is party to the
United Nations Convention Against Torture, although it only ratified
62
the Convention subject to certain reservations and understandings.
Nevertheless, President Bush has also argued that captured
terrorists are a vital source of intelligence about terrorist
organizations and operations. According to the president, such
detainees are “the most important source of information on where
63
the terrorists are hiding and what they are planning.” Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice has repeated these sentiments, arguing that
some terrorist suspects “have information that may save lives,
perhaps even thousands of lives,” and that they must be interrogated
to “gather potentially significant, life-saving, intelligence.”64 The
emphasis placed on gathering this information raises the question of
whether the United States would ever engage in or condone
interrogational torture to pry information out of recalcitrant
detainees. The answer to this question is more complex than the
United States’ strong rhetoric against torture indicates.

59. Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 103 (“The major function of the Committee Against
Torture is to monitor the implementation of the Convention.”). The Committee Against
Torture was established under Article 17 of the Convention and acts according to the
procedures established in Articles 19–21. Id.
60. Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Sec’y for the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
& Labor, Opening Statement for U.S.: Hearing at Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68558.htm.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. George W. Bush, Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1570
(Sept. 6, 2006).
64. Rice, supra note 58.
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III. THE UNITED STATES’
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
A. Implementing the United Nations Convention Against Torture
The United States Senate ratified the Convention Against
Torture in November 1994, subject to a number of reservations and
understandings.65 Under U.S. law, reservations, understandings, and
declarations are conditions placed on treaties that “are designed to
harmonize . . . treaties with existing requirements of U.S. law and to
leave domestic implementation of the treaties to Congress.”66 The
Senate’s reservations and understandings for the Convention Against
Torture included a provision stating that “the United States declares
that the provisions of Articles 1 through 16 of the Convention are not
self-executing,”67 meaning that the obligations imposed by those
68
articles had to be legislatively implemented to have the force of law.
In addition, the Senate modified the “substantial grounds” standard
found in Article 3,69 stating that “the United States understands the
phrase, ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture,’ as used in Article 3
of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would
70
be tortured.’”
After ratification of the treaty, Congress took legislative steps to
implement the Convention’s requirements. Primary among these was
the passage of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of
71
1998 (FARRA), which gave effect to the Convention Against
Torture using the following language:

65. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198–99 (1990) (including a number of reservations and
declarations in the Senate’s resolution of ratification).
66. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Humans Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 416 (2000).
67. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990).
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111(3) (1987) (“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international
law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a ‘non-self-executing’
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”).
69. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1 (“No State Party shall
expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
70. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990).
71. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to
Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture)). In addition, the Torture
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It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in
which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would
be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the
72
person is physically present in the United States.

FARRA required that “the heads of the appropriate agencies . . .
prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United
73
States under Article 3” of the Convention Against Torture. Such
regulations have been promulgated by the Department of Homeland
74
75
Security (DHS) (the successor to the INS ), the Department of
76
77
Justice (DOJ), and the State Department. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) has presumably instituted similar regulations, though
78
these regulations, if they exist, are not public information.
Under the regulations that apply to the DHS and the DOJ,
enforcement of a removal order may be withheld or deferred for
aliens who meet their burden of proof if “the immigration judge
determines that the alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the
79
country of removal.” The State Department’s regulations implement
the same standard with respect to extraditions, where the question
considered is “whether a person facing extradition from the United
States ‘is more likely than not’ to be tortured in the State requesting
extradition.”80 This implementation of the Convention Against
Torture raises concerns about its efficacy and ability to prevent
extraordinary renditions undertaken to facilitate interrogational
torture.

Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 to 2340B (2006), also represents a partial implementation of the
Convention’s requirements.
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return
of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture).
73. Id.
74. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–.18 (2007).
75. See 6 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2006) (abolishing the Immigration and Naturalization Service);
§ 291(b) (establishing the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services within the
Department of Homeland Security).
76. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–.18.
77. 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2007).
78. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., NO. RL32890,
RENDITIONS: CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY LAWS ON TORTURE, at 11 (2007); Radsan, supra note
4, at 21 (“Whether or not the CIA has adopted regulations to implement Article Three
principles is classified.”).
79. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(4), 1208.16(c)(4) (2007).
80. 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (2007).
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1. Alteration of the Governing Standard. One of the most
striking features of the understandings and reservations that the
Senate attached to the Convention Against Torture is their
substitution of a “more likely than not” and “would be tortured” test
for the Convention’s language that specifies “substantial grounds”
and “would be in danger of being subjected to torture” as the proper
81
test. Professor Robert Chesney notes that the “substantial grounds”
standard is critically important because it “functions as a standard of
proof, setting the evidentiary bar for triggering a state’s Article 3
82
obligations.” Changing that standard compromises the heart of
Article 3’s protection against rendition to torture. The United States
has responded that its replacement of the “substantial grounds”
standard with a “more likely than not” test was “merely a clarification
of the definitional scope of Article 3, rather than a statement that
would exclude or modify the legal effect of Article 3 as it applied to
the United States.”83 This explanation, however, ignores the clear
difference between the “substantial grounds” standard and the “more
likely than not” test.
First, “more likely than not” establishes a higher burden of proof
for a person seeking protection under Article 3 than “substantial
grounds” does.84 “More likely than not” seems to require something
greater than a 50 percent chance of torture, whereas a significantly
smaller chance of torture might constitute “substantial grounds” for
believing that a person would be tortured. In INS v. CardozaFonseca,85 the Supreme Court held that a person seeking asylum need
not show that persecution was “more likely than not” to satisfy the

81. This standard comes from one of the United States’ reservations made in ratifying the
Convention Against Torture, which says, “the United States understands the phrase, ‘where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture,’ as used in Article 3 of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he
would be tortured.’” 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990) (quoting Convention Against Torture,
supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1).
82. Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee
Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 671 (2006).
83. United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against
Torture, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68554.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
84. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 19 (arguing that this change “may have actually watered
down the CAT’s requirement, making it easier to be in compliance on renditions”); John Yoo,
Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1228 (2004) (stating that this change
“substantively limits the [United States’] obligations under Article 3”).
85. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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86
“well-founded fear of persecution” standard. As the Court put it,
“One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening
when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking
87
place.” The Court went on to endorse one commentator’s suggestion
that a one in ten chance of severe persecution (death or exile and
imprisonment in a labor camp) would suffice to create a well-founded
88
fear. Similarly, something less that 50 percent could presumably
constitute “substantial grounds for believing that [a person] would be
in danger of being subjected to torture.”89 Thus the “more likely than
not” standard is more permissive than the test established by the
Convention Against Torture.
Second, a less obvious alteration shifts the question from
90
whether a person would be “in danger of being subjected to torture”
to whether a person actually “would be tortured.”91 This change,
though subtle, shifts the inquiry toward individual risk and away from
the destination country’s reputation. For example, under the
substantial grounds standard, removing a person into the custody of a
country with an extremely poor human rights record might, in and of
itself, create sufficient danger to meet the Convention’s standard.92 By
altering the standard to consider whether torture would occur,
however, the United States directs attention away from the
destination country’s reputation and emphasizes the individual case.
This may contribute to excessive reliance on diplomatic promises to
refrain from torture, given that diplomatic assurances are more
attuned to addressing individual cases than overall reputation. Thus,
the United States’ implementation of the Convention Against
Torture distorts the original standard, replacing a standard that seeks

86. Id. at 431.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1.
90. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 2 (“No State Party shall expel,
return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
91. 136 CONG. REC. 25, 36198 (1990) (“[T]he United States understands the phrase, ‘where
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture,’ as used in Article 3 of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he
would be tortured.’”).
92. Radsan, supra note 4, at 62 (describing Uzbekistan, Egypt, and Syria as three countries
with such poor human rights records that any renditions to these countries would strain
credulity with regard to compliance with the Convention Against Torture).
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to avert all substantial dangers of torture with one that seeks only to
prevent torture that will more likely than not actually occur.
2. Reliance on Diplomatic Assurances. When determining
whether to remove or transfer an individual, the United States
sometimes considers diplomatic assurances that the receiving country
93
will not torture that individual. According to the State Department’s
2005 report to the Committee Against Torture, “The United States
obtains assurances, as appropriate, from the foreign government to
which a detainee is transferred that it will not torture the individual
being transferred.”94 Addressing allegations about extraordinary
renditions, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stated that “[w]here
appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that transferred
persons will not be tortured.”95 Nothing in the Convention Against
Torture makes relying on such assurances illegal.96 According to the
Convention, “competent authorities shall take into account all
relevant considerations” when determining whether there are
substantial grounds for believing that a person would be in danger of
97
being tortured. The United States treats diplomatic assurances as
this type of relevant information when making an individualized
assessment about whether an individual is “more likely than not” to
be tortured.98 According to the United States’ Second Periodic Report
to the Committee Against Torture, such assurances have, in a “very
small number of cases,” formed the basis for allowing individuals to
be removed.99
The consideration of such assurances is part of the legal
framework that implements the Convention Against Torture in

93. Id. at 44 (“On several occasions, the Bush Administration has noted that assurances
affect its decisions on transfers of prisoners.”).
94. U.S. Dep’t of State et al., Second Periodic Report to the Committee Against Torture,
¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents
/organization/62175.pdf.
95. Rice, supra note 58.
96. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 43–54 (discussing the use of diplomatic assurances under
Article 3).
97. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 2.
98. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 23 (“[I]n the immigration context, assurances are laid out
as one explicit factor in determining the legality of a rendition.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)
(2007) (describing how assurances may be considered in deciding whether removal is consistent
with Article 3).
99. U.S. Dep’t of State et al., supra note 94, para. 33.
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immigration removal and extradition contexts. In immigration
removal cases, the relevant regulations provide that
(1) The Secretary of State may forward to the Attorney General
assurances that the Secretary has obtained from the government of a
specific country that an alien would not be tortured there if the alien
were removed to that country.
(2) If the Secretary of State forwards assurances described in
paragraph (c)(1) of this section to the Attorney General for
consideration by the Attorney General or her delegates under this
paragraph, the Attorney General shall determine, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, whether the assurances are sufficiently
reliable to allow the alien’s removal to that country consistent with
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. The Attorney
General’s authority under this paragraph may be exercised by the
Deputy Attorney General or by the Commissioner, Immigration
100
and Naturalization Service, but may not be further delegated.

The regulations governing extradition101 and inadmissibility for
102
do not explicitly mention assurances, but
security reasons
assurances could presumably serve similar purposes in those contexts.
Extraordinary renditions carried out by the CIA probably operate
under similar guidelines, though such matters are classified
information.103
This reliance on assurances is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, a need to procure such assurances to comply with
Article 3 indicates that the receiving country may already have a
questionable human rights record, which itself suggested an increased
104
likelihood that an individual would be tortured. Second, monitoring
compliance with such assurances is difficult, if not impossible, because

100. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c) (2007). Identical regulations govern the Executive Office of
Immigration Review. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(c) (2007).
101. 22 C.F.R. § 95 (2007).
102. 8 C.F.R. § 235.8 (2007).
103. See sources cited supra note 78.
104. See Dawn J. Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obligations: The United Nations
Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 303 (2003) (“[P]ast torture is evidence of the likelihood of future torture, and
absent a showing of change in the human rights conditions of a country where past torture was
experienced, such evidence is likely to be extremely persuasive.”); see also Lobel, supra note 5,
at 1414 (“[G]overnment actions that are based on predictions or suspicions about future conduct
are inherently less subject to clear rules than those based on evidence of what has already
occurred.”).
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“torture is conducted in secret and regimes that use torture have
105
become adept at hiding it.” Without effective monitoring, a
receiving country has little incentive to refrain from engaging in
106
torture, given that its noncompliance will likely remain unknown.
Third, procuring assurances could (and perhaps has) become a rubber
stamp for complying with the Convention Against Torture. Given
that monitoring is difficult and that the incentives to prevent torture
post hoc are relatively low, obtaining assurances may be a pro forma
way to feign compliance with the Convention Against Torture.107
Because of these problems, assurances should be used sparingly, if at
all. Liberal use of such assurances effectively eviscerates the
determination of whether an individual is “more likely than not” to
be tortured—a determination that lies at the very heart of the
Convention Against Torture.
The possibility that such assurances have become a rubber stamp
is particularly pertinent to Maher Arar’s case; he was reportedly only
removed to Syria after the United States “received assurances from
108
Syria that Arar would not be tortured.” Given Syria’s exceedingly
109
poor human rights record, it is difficult to understand how removing
anyone into Syrian custody could have comported with the

105. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 89.
106. See Chesney, supra note 82, at 696 (“[T]here is also substantial reason to doubt that
compliance-monitoring mechanisms . . . will succeed in detecting abuse. . . . [E]ven in the event
that non-compliance is detected, there are no mechanisms in place to impose accountability.”
(footnotes omitted)).
107. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL AT RISK: DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES NO
SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE 3 (2005), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/eca0405/
eca0405.pdf (“[C]ountries that rely on such assurances are either engaging in wishful thinking or
using the assurances as a figleaf to cover their complicity in torture and their role in the erosion
of the international norm against torture.”).
108. DeNeen L. Brown, Canadian Sent to Mideast Files Suit, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at
A25. For an account of Arar’s experiences, see supra notes 18–39 and accompanying text.
109. Amnesty Int’l, Syrian Arab Republic: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee, 71st
Session – March 2001, art. 7, MDE 24/001/2001 (Aug. 13, 2001), available at http://web.amnesty.
org/library/pdf/MDE240012001ENGLISH/$File/MDE2400101.pdf (describing how Amnesty
International has human rights concerns regarding Syrian torture practices). The State
Department’s 2002 report on Syria’s human rights practices stated that its “human rights record
remained poor, and it continued to commit serious abuses. . . . Continuing serious abuses
included the use of torture in detention . . . . [T]here was credible evidence that security forces
continued to use torture . . . .” BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, 108TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2002,
at 2108–09 (Joint Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/
18289.htm.
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110
Convention Against Torture, yet Syria’s assurances apparently
sufficed in Arar’s case. If diplomatic assurances are given such
significant weight without reciprocal accountability through effective
111
monitoring, the protections of Article 3 are slight indeed.

3. Designation of an Interested Decisionmaker. The United
States’ implementation of the Convention Against Torture also fails
to provide full Article 3 protection, because the process for
determining whether a person is protected from removal under
Article 3 invites an improper balancing of the state’s interests against
the individual’s interests. Under the existing regulations,
determinations of whether a detainee is “more likely than not” to
suffer torture may be made at the highest levels, usually by the
secretary of state or the attorney general.112 As high-level executive
branch officials, these decisionmakers are also likely to know about
the potential intelligence value of detainees, and this knowledge may
influence their decisions. For example, a decisionmaker might believe
that a particular detainee knew important information about
impending terrorist plots, but would not disclose that information
under interrogations carried out within the bounds of domestic law.
Rendering that person to a country that practiced more forceful
interrogation techniques might yield valuable information and save
American lives. Knowing the potential benefits of more intensive
questioning could influence that decisionmaker’s determination about
whether removing or rendering a particular suspect would comport
with Article 3. This type of balancing, however, is entirely contrary to
the purpose of the Convention Against Torture, which expressly
prohibits torture regardless of what exigent circumstances arise.113
4. Evasion of Judicial Review and Public Scrutiny. In its written
response to questions from the Committee Against Torture, the

110. Radsan, supra note 4, at 62 (noting that any renditions to Syria might run afoul of the
Convention Against Torture because of Syria’s poor human rights record).
111. Arar’s case demonstrates a lack of effective monitoring, despite the United States’
reliance on diplomatic assurances. Indeed, even the visits of Canadian consular officials were
ineffective at stopping the torture. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
112. 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1–.3 (2007) (authorizing the Secretary of State and the Deputy
Secretary of State to make Article 3 determinations in extradition cases).
113. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2, para. 2 (“No exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability
or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”).
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United States reiterated that it “does not comment on information or
114
reports relating to alleged intelligence operations.” The United
States has largely refrained from commenting on the case of Maher
115
Arar, despite the widespread publicity his story has received. This
silence extends to the process of extraordinary rendition, which the
United States generally does not publicly acknowledge.116 This opacity
is only augmented by the fact that the legislation implementing the
Convention expressly states that no court has jurisdiction to review
regulations promulgated under it.117 The various implementing
regulations reiterate this restriction on the availability of judicial
118
review. Furthermore, Arar’s case demonstrates how difficult it is to
bring a claim based on a determination under the Convention Against
Torture, and he was removed after being deemed inadmissible for
security reasons, not through the more covert process of
extraordinary rendition.119 Even if one or more of Arar’s claims had
withstood initial review in federal district court, he still would have
needed to overcome the assertion of the “state-secrets privilege,”
with its attendant deference to the government action in question.120
Given this lack of information and the restrictions placed on judicial
review, the practical application of the “more likely than not”
standard takes place with little transparency or accountability.121

114. United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against
Torture, supra note 83.
115. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2006), available at http://ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf
(“There was a great deal of media coverage of Mr. Arar’s case in the later stages of his
imprisonment in Syria and even more after his return to Canada.”).
116. See Radsan, supra note 4, at 50 (“Except for isolated comments by a few officials, the
Bush Administration has not said much about irregular rendition.”).
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2006) (United States Policy with Respect to Involuntary Return
of Persons in Danger of Subjection to Torture) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review the
regulations adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section shall be construed as
providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this
section . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (2007) (“Decisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of
fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion not subject to judicial review.”).
119. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
120. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
121. The combination of government silence, the lack of judicial review, and the fact that a
detainee rendered to another country is likely unable to protest all combine to shroud these
determinations in secrecy. Cases that come to light (like Maher Arar’s) are likely the exception,
not the rule.
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B. Avoidance and the Fourth Geneva Convention
Outside the domestic legal context, the United States has
122
reportedly used extraordinary renditions in the war in Iraq. Those
extraordinary renditions must be evaluated according to the legal
obligations imposed by the Geneva Conventions.123 The United
States’ legal analysis of the permissibility of extraordinary rendition
in Iraq proceeded from the assumption that detainees whom it
wanted to render were protected persons.124 In dealing with such
“protected persons,” Article 49 states: “Individual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their
motive.”125
Despite the language of Article 49, the United States has
explored ways to circumvent the prohibition on removing “protected
persons” from the occupied territory of Iraq. In a draft
126
memorandum, then-Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith,
the head of the Office of Legal Counsel,127 examined the applicability
of Article 49 and concluded:
[T]he United States may, consistent with article 49, (1) remove
“protected persons” who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to
local immigration law; and (2) relocate “protected persons”
(whether illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to

122. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 64 n.351.
123. For background on the Fourth Geneva Convention, see supra Part I.B.
124. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 65 n.351 (stating that the memorandum concerns “protected
persons”).
125. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49, para. 1.
126. Draft Memorandum from Jack Goldsmith, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Mar. 19,
2004), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 366–80 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum].
127. The Office of Legal Counsel is housed within the Justice Department, and “[t]he
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel assists the Attorney
General in his function as legal advisor to the President and all the executive branch agencies.”
United States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc (last
visited Mar. 8, 2008).
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facilitate interrogation, for a brief but not indefinite period, so long
128
as adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated against them.

Goldsmith’s analysis separated “protected persons” into three groups:
illegal aliens, those who have been accused of an offense, and those
129
who have not been accused of an offense.
For illegal aliens, Goldsmith argued that Article 49 does not
apply because the terms “deportations” and “forcible transfers” refer
to permanent transfers of inhabitants from areas in which they had a
130
lawful right to be. He argued that in international law the term
“deportation” meant “removal of a person from a country where he
has a legal right to be,” rather than simply meaning removing a
131
person from one country to another. Goldsmith then addressed the
term “transfer,” concluding that it is used somewhat interchangeably
with “deportation,” and thus only applies to legal inhabitants of the
occupied territory.132 To make this case, Goldsmith cited instances in
which the words have been used interchangeably or the word
“deportation” has been used as shorthand for describing the Article
49 prohibition.133 This evidence shows that these terms do overlap to
some extent, but does not shed light on what distinguishes the two
terms. Given that these terms do not apply to illegal aliens,
Goldsmith concluded that illegal aliens were not protected by Article
49.134
Goldsmith argued that this implicit exception to the Article 49
prohibition on deporting or forcibly transferring “protected persons”
“comports with common sense” because failing to remove illegal
aliens would make the Convention “a welcome mat to occupied
135
territory.” Yet Goldsmith himself noted that those who violate Iraqi
immigration law are subject to imprisonment, and that under
customary international law, the United States is likely required to
enforce the existing Iraqi immigration laws.136 This belies his

128. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 126, at 367–68.
129. Id. at 368, 374–75.
130. Id. at 374.
131. Id. at 371.
132. Id. at 371–72.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 372.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 374.
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suggestion that comprehensive Article 49 protection would constitute
a “welcome mat” for illegal aliens.
Given that the plain language of Article 49 establishes a blanket
137
an
prohibition of forcible transfers of “protected persons,”
exception to that prohibition should only be allowed when it can be
demonstrated with equal clarity. Goldsmith’s memorandum does not
convincingly show that the term “transfer” only applies to legal
inhabitants. Thus, Article 49 seems to protect even illegal aliens from
forcible transfer, though they could still be imprisoned under local
law. This conclusion also comports with Article 76,138 which requires
that “[p]rotected persons accused of offences [presumably even
immigration-related offenses] shall be detained in the occupied
country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein.”139
Goldsmith’s second argument proceeded on the foundation
created by his analysis of “deportations” and “transfers.” First, he
acknowledged that Article 76 clearly prohibits removing a “protected
person” against whom “adjudicative proceedings have been
140
Nevertheless, Goldsmith argued that the terms
initiated.”
“deportation” and “transfer” reference only an extended, indefinite,
141
or permanent removal from the occupied country. Goldsmith said
that these terms have the connotation of “uprooting from one’s
home” and suggest that “resettlement” will be required.142 They do
not include a “mere temporary absence, for a brief and definite
143
Thus Goldsmith
period, from one’s still-established home.”
concluded that it would be permissible to relocate people in this class
of protected persons to another country for a “brief but not indefinite
period” to facilitate interrogation.144
This analysis goes to some lengths to recast the straightforward
prohibition found in Article 49. It establishes two distinct
justifications for why extraordinary rendition of a “protected person”
from Iraq to another country would not violate Article 49. First, an

137. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 49, para. 1.
138. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 55, at 363 (describing Article 76 as
“based on the fundamental principle forbidding deportations laid down in Article 49”).
139. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 76, para. 1.
140. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 126, at 375.
141. Id. at 375–76.
142. Id. at 376.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 379.
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individual who is an illegal alien does not receive Article 49
145
protection. This raises the question whether an illegal alien could be
removed to any nation willing to receive that individual. Presumably,
an illegal alien would need to be charged under Iraqi immigration
law, which would seem to implicate the protection against removal
found in Article 76, which applies to “[p]rotected persons accused of
146
offences.” Second, a “protected person” could be removed through
extraordinary rendition so long as that removal was a “temporary
relocation . . . for a brief but not indefinite period.”147
Why would the United States go to such lengths to justify
removing a “protected person” from Iraq? The memorandum
concludes that the United States may “relocate ‘protected persons’
(whether illegal aliens or not) from Iraq to another country to
facilitate interrogation.”148 This reason is repeated throughout the
memorandum, and no other explanations are offered, though
explanations such as prison overcrowding and detainee safety might
be plausible alternatives. This focus on “facilitating interrogation,”
though, raises a number of questions: Where would these detainees
be sent? How would carrying out an interrogation in another country
facilitate that interrogation? What safeguards would prevent the
receiving countries from torturing detainees to facilitate their
interrogation? The commonly proffered argument is that “an allied
nation may have cultural or linguistic connections with a captured
individual that the United States lacks, placing that nation in a
position to more effectively establish a rapport with the individual
and allowing for more effective interrogations.”149 The more cynical
explanation is that some countries interrogate more effectively
150
because they utilize torture. Given the United States’ insistence that
this type of extraordinary rendition does not violate Article 49, it is

145. See supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.
146. IV Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 76, para. 1.
147. Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 126, at 380.
148. Id. at 368.
149. Yoo, supra note 84, at 1187.
150. See ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 4–5 (“U.S. officials reportedly are seeking opportunities to transfer
terrorist suspects to locations where it is known that they may be tortured, hoping to gain useful
information with the use of abusive interrogation tactics.”); Radsan, supra note 4, at 3
(“[A]ccording to the surprisingly candid statements of one CIA official, officials in other
countries might use interrogation techniques that the United States does not, may not, and
should not use.”).
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reasonable to question its underlying motives. Responding to
criticism of this memorandum, Goldsmith notes that he “never
finalized the draft, it never became operational, and it was never
151
relied on to take anyone outside of Iraq.” Nevertheless, the
memorandum’s focus on circumventing legal protections to enable
extraterritorial interrogations exemplifies a common tendency in the
struggle against terrorism.
IV. THE PRECARIOUS STATE
OF THE ABSOLUTE NORM AGAINST TORTURE
A. The Expedience of Interrogational Torture
The United States remains opposed to torture based on most of
the traditional motivations for torture that Professor David Luban
identifies, including “victor’s pleasure, terror, punishment, and
extracting confessions.”152 Nevertheless, Luban also suggests that
modern liberalism (in the sense of “liberal democracy”) might not be
wholly opposed to “torture as a technique of intelligence gathering
from captives who will not talk.”153 Torturing terrorists may seem like
a small price to pay when that torture could yield lifesaving
154
information. Indeed, by offering a humanitarian motivation for
torture, this understanding dissociates torture from its most illiberal
aspects—its inherent cruelty, tyrannical nature, and disregard for
human dignity.155 In this context, preventive interrogational torture is
portrayed as almost pragmatic and humanitarian, rather than simply
barbaric and authoritarian.156
This utilitarian motivation for torture seems to have become
more prominent given the attention paid to terrorism as a national
151. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 172 (2007). Goldsmith also says that the
memorandum noted that “persons temporarily relocated outside of Iraq” would retain their
Geneva Convention protections against torture. Id. at 242–43 n.45.
152. Luban, supra note 16, at 1436.
153. Id.
154. Professor Alan Dershowitz describes the calculus under which nonlethal torture might
be warranted: “The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal torture seems
overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on one guilty terrorist who is illegally
withholding information needed to prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of
innocent victims to die.” ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING
THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 144 (2002).
155. See Luban, supra note 16, at 1430 (“Torture aims to strip away from its victim all the
qualities of human dignity that liberalism prizes.”).
156. See id. at 1436 (“Torture to gather intelligence and save lives seems almost heroic.”).
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157
security threat. The difficulties of dealing with decentralized
terrorist organizations have created new challenges and rendered
many of the intelligence-gathering methods calibrated to deal with
158
nation-state actors relatively ineffective. Professor Jules Lobel
describes the United States’ response to the attacks of September 11,
2001, in terms of a “preventative paradigm”: “The Bush
administration’s response to the September 11 attacks has been
characterized by a paradigm shift in fighting terrorism: from a
defensive to offensive strategy, from reliance on deterrence to a new
emphasis on preemption, from backward to forward-looking
measures, and from prosecution to prevention.”159 Given the
decentralized way in which terrorist organizations operate, good
intelligence is crucial to disrupting their operations and preventing
attacks.160 Although captured terrorists may have good intelligence to
offer, they may be loath to reveal information that would endanger
fellow terrorists, undermine the organizations they represent, and
frustrate their attempts to launch additional attacks. This need for
information explains why the incentive to engage in or condone
interrogational torture has increased with the growing struggle
against terrorism. Though torture may yield some false confessions, it
also sometimes yields good information, particularly when the
information sought is easily verified.161 As Professor Alan Dershowitz
argues, “It is impossible to avoid the difficult moral dilemma of
choosing among evils by denying the empirical reality that torture
sometimes works, even if it does not always work.”162 Thus, the
preventive paradigm has placed a premium on intelligence, thereby

157. See Lobel, supra note 5, at 1408 (“The administration has justified its use of coercive
interrogation tactics against detainees . . . by asserting the necessity of preventing future
terrorist attacks.”). Professor Lobel contends that the Bush administration has focused on
“coercive prevention,” which entails using force “to detain suspected terrorists . . . and send
individuals to nations that will detain and likely torture them.” Id. at 1409.
158. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 151, at 72–74 (describing how the struggle against
terrorism involves far more uncertainty and “chronic obscurity” than prior military struggles
against other nations that took place in specific geographic locations).
159. Lobel, supra note 5, at 1407.
160. See id. at 1409 (“The turn toward prevention is not surprising. When faced with
potential terrorist threats, it makes sense to focus efforts on preventing future attacks, as
opposed to merely punishing those who have attacked the United States.”).
161. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 154, at 136–37 (“There are numerous instances in which
torture has produced self-proving, truthful information that was necessary to prevent harm to
civilians.”).
162. Id. at 137.
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making interrogational torture expedient and revealing weaknesses in
the United States’ implementation of international prohibitions on
torture.
B. The Arar Case as Evidence of a Declining Norm
163

Maher Arar’s story presents a specific example of how the
United States might profit from interrogational torture while
apparently complying with its implementation of the Convention
Against Torture. It thus presents a useful test case for evaluating the
United States’ implementation of the Convention, given that Arar
was removed to Syria through normal removal processes.164 Despite
these processes, however, Arar allegedly experienced the very sort of
torture that the Convention seeks to prevent. Notably, the torture
alleged in Arar’s complaint fits the pattern of torture that the State
Department detailed in its 2002 report on human rights practices in
Syria. According to that report, “there was credible evidence that
[Syrian] security forces continued to use torture.”165 Accounts of statesponsored torture in Syria include reports of torture by a variety of
methods, including
administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing
objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim is
suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; bending the
detainees into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed body
parts; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate the
166
victim or fracture the victim’s spine.

In addition, the report noted that although torture did occur in Syrian
prisons, it was “most likely to occur while detainees were being held
at one of the many detention centers run by the various security
services throughout the country, especially while the authorities were
attempting to extract a confession or information.”167 This fits with
Arar’s story, given that he was tortured using some of these methods
and threatened with others, all with the goal of extracting information
from him.168 In Arar’s case, the regulations that implement the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See supra notes 18–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, supra note 109, at 2109.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
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Convention Against Torture apparently failed to protect him from
torture. Indeed, they not only failed to protect him from torture
generally, but also failed to protect him from the very kinds of torture
that the United States government knew Syria practiced.
V. ADDRESSING THE EROSION OF THE NORM AGAINST TORTURE
Increased political pressure to forestall terrorist attacks and
eradicate terrorist networks has revealed significant flaws in the
United States’ implementation of the Convention Against Torture.169
This inadequate implementation likely originated in concern over
subjecting U.S. sovereignty to broadly written international
170
agreements. Though these shortcomings have existed since the
Convention was first implemented, the struggle against terrorism has
greatly magnified their pernicious effects.171 Its origins aside, the
172
lessons of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison and cases like
Maher Arar’s demand decisive action to strengthen U.S. adherence to
international norms against torture. Such action could conceivably
originate in the executive or legislative branch, but legislative change
would be preferable. Legislative change would be more effective
because the pressure to combat terrorism falls most directly on the

169. See supra Parts III–IV.
170. See Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 109 (“The United States’ long refusal to ratify
the Convention Against Torture is indicative of its general unwillingness to subscribe to the
treaty-based regime concerned with international human rights.”); John B. Bellinger III, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Transatlantic Approaches to International Law and Institutions,
Speech at Duke University School of Law: Center for International and Comparative Law
(Nov. 15, 2006), in 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 513, 517–19 (2007) (describing how differences
in historical experience, legal tradition, and national culture make the United State more
hesitant than its European allies to endorse legal frameworks that codify broad principles and
create comprehensive systems of rules). Bellinger states that the United States’
problem-oriented approach also predisposes us to distinguish between issues that we
believe lend themselves to international legal resolution and those that do not. This
can be at odds with a European tendency—heightened by experience with the
European Union—to see the ideal international legal framework as one that is
comprehensive and cohesive, that covers the field.
Id. at 519.
171. See sources cited supra note 3.
172. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, International Criminal Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 579, 593–96 (2004)
(summarizing accounts of American military personnel abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison).
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173
174
executive branch. The president is “Commander in Chief” and has
175
extensive responsibility for the nation’s foreign affairs. Therefore,
pressure to gather useful intelligence and forestall terrorist attacks
falls primarily on the president and executive agencies under the
president’s control, especially intelligence agencies like the CIA and
the National Security Agency.
In an ideal scenario, the executive branch would strengthen the
international norm against torture by giving more credence to a
country’s human rights record and less to its diplomatic assurances.
Given that the executive branch stands at the forefront of U.S.
foreign policy, its conduct inevitably affects domestic and
international perceptions about the United States’ stance on torture.
Memoranda that attempt to circumvent international legal
obligations or redefine what constitutes torture convey a discontinuity
between the United States’ rhetoric and practice on the issue of
torture. Regardless of what occurs in practice, the impression that the
United States condones torture is enough to weaken the international
norm against torture.176 Unfortunately, the political pressures on the
executive branch have apparently encouraged a belief in the merits of
interrogational torture.177 This understanding has been formed outside
the typical channels of political dialogue and implemented in a
secretive manner that is antithetical to the democratic principles of
transparency and accountability.178

173. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 151, at 75 (describing “an executive branch entirely
responsible for protecting the safety of Americans but largely in the dark about where or how
the next terrorist attack will occur”).
174. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States . . . .”).
175. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.” (quoting Representative John Marshall, 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
176. See Weissbrodt & Bergquist, supra note 3, at 127 & n.33 (describing extraordinary
rendition as a practice that “involves the state-sponsored abduction of a person in one country,
with or without the cooperation of the government of that country, and the subsequent transfer
of that person to another country for detention and interrogation” (footnotes omitted)).
177. See Luban, supra note 16, at 1452–61 (describing the “torture culture” created by a
“group of lawyers in President George W. Bush’s administration who wrote the highlypermissive secret memoranda that came close to legitimizing torture for interrogational
purposes”).
178. See Nagan & Atkins, supra note 48, at 89 (“[T]he practice of torture is often among the
least transparent aspects of governmental policy and practice.”); Radsan, supra note 4, at 4
(“[R]endition is the hidden domain of intelligence services, not the open realm of courts,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers.”); id. at 51 (arguing that the “administration should move
from secrecy toward transparency” regarding the practice of extraordinary rendition).
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Given its self-chosen international legal obligation to prevent
torture, the United States should publicly announce any fundamental
change in its policy regarding torture. Similarly, as a constitutional
democracy, a fundamental change of this magnitude should issue
from transparent democratic process, not from secret, high-level
policy decisions. To address the issue of torture in the context of
extraordinary renditions, the United States government needs to
reinforce its implementation of the international norms against statesponsored torture through legislation that openly ventilates the issue
of interrogational torture.
Congress should
adopt
legislation
strengthening
its
implementation of Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. In
essence, this legislation would supplement the initial implementation
of the Convention. Such legislation would be designed to reduce the
burden of proof on applicants who seek to defer removal, replacing
the “more likely than not” standard with something closer to the
“substantial grounds” standard found in the Convention Against
Torture or the “well-founded fear of persecution” standard that
179
operates in the asylum context. In addition, this legislation should
make the provisions of the Convention Against Torture applicable to
extraordinary renditions that take place outside the United States.
Finally, Congress should revise the existing system to incorporate an
impartial decisionmaker who could better ensure compliance with
Article 3. This revised decisionmaking process could take a variety of
forms, as long as it separated the determination of whether removal
was consistent with Article 3 from the knowledge of an individual’s
potential intelligence value.
If Congress and the president are unwilling to strengthen the
United States’ implementation and application of the Convention
Against Terror, their reasons for opposing a more robust policy
prohibiting torture should be addressed through public debate.
Professor Dershowitz has rightly noted that “[i]f we tolerate torture,
but keep it off the books and below the radar screen, we compromise
principles of democratic accountability.”180 As noted in Part II, the
United States has maintained strong rhetorical opposition to torture,

179. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)
(2006)) (describing how the “well-founded fear of persecution” standard operates in certain
asylum cases).
180. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 154, at 153.
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181
regardless of the circumstances. If that position no longer reflects
either the normative view of policymakers or the objective reality on
the ground, that change should be publicly acknowledged. That
discussion could take place on an abstract level and in general policy
terms without revealing sensitive national security information. The
possibility of institutionalizing torture by requiring a legal “torture
warrant,” a proposal made by Professor Dershowitz, could provide a
starting point for this debate.182 Under his proposal,

An application for a torture warrant would have to be based on the
absolute need to obtain immediate information in order to save lives
coupled with probable cause that the suspect had such information
and is unwilling to reveal it.
The suspect would be given immunity from prosecution based on
information elicited by the torture. The warrant would limit the
torture to nonlethal means, such as sterile needles, being inserted
beneath the nails to cause excruciating pain without endangering
183
life.

This proposal is not intended to rationalize or endorse statesponsored torture. If the United States is not willing to strengthen its
laws and policies to match its strong rhetorical stance against torture,
that alone indicates that this debate is likely already occurring, and
ground has been given to torture advocates at the highest political
levels. This debate must be public because it concerns a fundamental
moral and ethical decision with vast implications. Such decisions are
best made through an open and transparent democratic process, not
by elite policymakers.
CONCLUSION
The events of September 11, 2001, awakened the United States
to the threat of international terrorism. In response to that threat, the
United States has undertaken a comprehensive struggle against

181. See supra Part II.
182. Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at
A19. Professor Dershowitz is not alone in having proposed legalizing torture as an alternative to
its extralegal use. See, e.g., Andrew H. Moyer, Note, The Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument for
Judicially Sanctioned Torture in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 469, 489 (2004)
(“Compared to the current policy of practicing torture ‘under the radar screen,’ however,
[judicially sanctioned torture] may indeed be the lesser of two evils.”).
183. Dershowitz, supra note 182.
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terrorism. In that struggle to prevent terrorist attacks, intelligence
information about terrorist organizations and their operations is at a
premium, yet developing such intelligence has proven difficult. This
intelligence-gathering problem has put pressure on the United States’
legal obligation to refrain from engaging in or condoning torture.
That pressure has revealed weaknesses in how that the United States
has implemented the Convention Against Torture. In addition, it has
shown that the efficacy of a strong norm against torture remains open
to debate within the United States.
The Convention Against Torture embodies a comprehensive
prohibition of torture in all circumstances. It goes beyond simply
requiring that its members refrain from state-sponsored torture and
mandates that they also avoid extraditing or returning individuals to
other countries when there are “substantial grounds for believing”
that those individuals would be in danger of being tortured.184 The
United States has partially implemented this norm into its legal
system, but that implementation leaves something to be desired. By
changing the standard from “substantial grounds for believing” that
an individual would be in danger of torture to “more likely than not”
that an individual would be tortured, the United States has made it
more difficult for an individual to successfully claim Article 3
protection. This protection has been reduced even further by the
United States’ reliance on diplomatic assurances that the destination
country will not torture the individual in question. Relying on such
assurances improperly discounts the human rights record of the
destination country and risks making assurances a talisman for
compliance, thus further weakening Article 3 protection against
torture. Finally, the decisionmaking process for Article 3 compliance
may be compromised when the decisionmaker also weighs
information about the potential intelligence value of the individual in
question. Such balancing is contrary to the absolute prohibition that
the Convention Against Torture establishes.
Thus far the debate about torture has stayed below the surface,
shielded from view by the secrecy surrounding intelligence affairs and
the lack of judicial review. The decision to facilitate interrogational
torture, however, should not be made without public debate and
democratic process. In light of the importance of this question,
Congress should strengthen the implementation of the existing

184.

Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 3, para. 1.
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international norms against state-sponsored torture, thereby opening
the issue up for public debate. Without substantive legislative reform
or open debate about the legitimacy of torturing suspected terrorists
for intelligence purposes, the United States’ use of extraordinary
renditions to facilitate interrogation will continue to subvert
transparent democratic process and undermine existing international
norms against state-sponsored torture.

